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Abstract 
 
This article considers the relationship between poverty in Rangoon and the ways in which both an imperial and 
a post-imperial urbanism helped ‘improve’, develop and reclaim Rangoon’s urban environment. Examining the 
actions of the Rangoon Development Trust before and after the Second World War in the context of actions 
taken by the Bombay Improvement Trust, Bombay Development Directorate, Singapore Improvement Trust and 
Hong Kong Housing Authority, it both analyses measures taken in Rangoon and constructs a connective history 
of urban development in relation to other Asian port cities. Incorporating documents released only in 2014 by 
the National Archives of Myanmar, this analysis for the first time considers interventions made in Rangoon’s 
post-war built environment of poverty, connecting these actions to policies constructed over the preceding 
decades. 
 
Main Text 
 
Shaping an imperial urbanism 
 
The outbreak and subsequent spread of the third plague pandemic that radiated from Hong 
Kong in 1894 brought with it a newfound interest in urban redevelopment schemes in cities 
across Asia.2 Looking to remake urban conditions seen as harbouring the disease, colonial 
authorities in cities along the Indian Ocean turned to land reclamation, public housing and 
communication schemes under the control of newly formed improvement trusts in the first 
decades of the twentieth century.3 In Bombay, where municipal and government authorities 
created the first improvement trust in Asia in 1898, the Trust was tasked with ‘opening out 
crowded localities’ in addition to ‘making new streets’ and reclaiming land ‘to provide room 
 
1 I would like to thank Tim Harper, Sasha Sahni, Camille Cole, Catherine Evans, Sunil Amrith and the 
anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and guidance at various stages of pursuing this research as 
well as the late Chris Bayly for encouraging me to pursue such research. I would also like to acknowledge and 
thank the History Project at the Joint Center for History and Economics, Harvard University and the Institute for 
New Economic Thinking (INET) for their support of this research. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the 
support of the Cambridge Overseas Trusts and the Smuts Memorial Fund in pursuing my research more broadly. 
2 Myron Echenberg, Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of Bubonic Plague,1894-1901 (New York: 
NYU Press, 2007); Robert Home, Of Planting and Planning : The Making of British Colonial Cities (London: E 
& FN Spon, 1997); Prashant Kidambi, The Making of an Indian Metropolis: Colonial Governance and Public 
Culture in Bombay, 1890-1920 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 71-114. 
3 For Calcutta see Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai, General Department (Henceforth MSA, GD), 1910, 
51, 452, p. M-S 12-3, H. Wheeler, ‘Deputation of the Hon'ble Mr C.H. Bompas, I.C.S. by the Government of 
Bengal to Bombay to study the working of the City of Bombay Improvement Trust’, 12 November 1910; For 
Bombay MSA, GD, 1899, 32, 36, p. M-S 227, ‘Administration Report of the City of Bombay Improvement 
Trust for the year ending on the 31st March 1899’, 31 March 1899; For Singapore see National Archives of 
Singapore, Singapore (Henceforth NAS), Housing Development Board Records, HDB 1090, SIT 744/50, p. 
001609-10, ‘Tiong Bahru Estate, History and Development of, 1950-1953’, 2 July 1952; For Hong Kong see 
United Kingdom National Archives, London, United Kingdom (Henceforth UKNA), CO 129/576/1, ‘Proposed 
schemes for improvements in housing conditions, 1938-1939’, 1939; For Rangoon see British Library, India 
Office Records, London, United Kingdom (Henceforth BL, IOR), V/27/780/12, 1917, ‘Report of the 
Departmental Committee on Town Planning, Burma’. 
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for the expansion of the city.’4 Justification for these trusts, though not exclusively focused 
on the living conditions of the urban poor, as was the case for the Rangoon Development 
Trust (RDT), was often built upon statements outlining that ‘there are in the first place 
several slums to be cleared away’.5 In focusing on slum clearance, squatter resettlement and 
redevelopment schemes, these trusts’ efforts, practices and techniques constitute a way in 
which an imperial urbanism was constructed around poverty in cities across British Asia. 
In describing imperial urbanism centred around poverty, this article is interested in 
thinking about ways in which British imperialism informed urban policies and spatial 
practices relating to the urban poor in port cities across British colonial Asia. Examining 
urban space in Delhi, Stephen Legg argues that ‘interlinked landscapes of ordering’ 
characterise the governmentality of the colonial state in an urban setting and suggests that 
Delhi’s landscapes of ordering could be further connected to urban spaces around British 
Asia.6 While this article is focused largely on what Legg characterises as residential ordering 
rather than interlinked landscapes, it argues that an imperial discourse on urbanism and 
poverty emerged in British Asia over the course of the twentieth century. Considering the 
emergence of this discourse, this article takes Rangoon as an important case study and builds 
upon existing literature connecting and analysing Rangoon. While Penny Edwards and 
Donald Seekins have examined Schwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon as a site of projecting and 
protesting power, their analyses are focused on the pagoda and do not consider other urban 
spaces, like residential areas, as sites of contestation. 7  Frasch and Kaur take a more 
comparative approach and analyse Rangoon’s transport systems and migrant worker’s health, 
respectively, with actions taken in British Malaya and Singapore.8 
Beyond the policies and practices that physically shaped urban built environments in Asian 
cities across the Indian Ocean, the construction of an imperial urbanism also engendered an 
exchange of people and ideas that wove the conditions of these cities together. Resting upon 
a port city paradigm, imperial urbanism in this instance illustrates the extent to which urban 
centres faced a relatable set of challenges around migration and poverty. 9  While Sunil 
Amrith, Nile Green and Su Lin Lewis have connected Burma and Rangoon to Asia littoral 
through migration, religious economy and print culture respectively, urban redevelopment 
schemes represent another way of linking Asian port cities to one another.10 This approach, 
 
4 MSA, GD, 1899, 32, 36, p. M-S 227, ‘Administration Report of the City of Bombay Improvement Trust for 
the year ending on the 31st March 1899’, 31 March 1899. 
5 BL, IOR V/27/780/12, Report of the Departmental Committee on Town Planning, Burma, Rangoon: Office 
of the Superintendent, Government Printing, Burma, 1917, p. 93 
6 Stephen Legg, Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi's Urban Governmentalities (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007), p. 216-8. 
7 Penny Edwards, 'Grounds for Protest: Placing Shwedagon Pagoda in Colonial and Postcolonial History,' 
Postcolonial Studies 9, 2 (2006); Donald M. Seekins, State and Society in Modern Rangoon (London: 
Routledge, 2011). 
8 Tilman Frasch, 'Tracks in the City: Technology, Mobility and Society in Colonial Rangoon and Singapore, 
Modern Asian Studies 46, 1 (2012); Amarjit Kaur, 'Indian Labour, Labour Standards, and Workers' Health in 
Burma and Malaya, 1900–1940,' Modern Asian Studies 40, 2 (2006). 
9 Tai-Yong Tan, 'Port Cities and Hinterlands: A Comparative Study of Singapore and Calcutta,' Political 
Geography 26, 7 (2007). 
10  Sunil S. Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The Furies of Nature and the Fortunes of Migrants 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); 'Reconstructing the 'Plural Society': Asian Migration 
between Empire and Nation, 1940-1948,' Past and Present 210, Supplement 6 (2011); Nile Green, 'Buddhism, 
Islam and the Religious Economy of Colonial Burma,' Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 46, 02 (2015); Su Lin 
Lewis, 'Print and Colonial Port Cultures of the Indian Ocean Littoral: Penang and Rangoon,' Journal of the 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 82, 2 (297) (2009); Cities in Motion: Urban Life and 
Cosmopolitanism in Southeast Asia, 1920–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). For more on 
the concept of port cities see Tan, op. cit.. 
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of connecting cities through imperial urbanisms, has recently been made in the context of 
Japanese imperialism in East Asia, but has remained less understood in the context of British 
imperialism in Asia.11 In line with recent literature interested in the histories of colonial 
Burma and how Burma fit into wider histories of the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean worlds, 
this article focuses on analysing Rangoon’s urban environment of poverty as it developed 
over the twentieth century through the late-colonial period, the Second World War and the 
early post-colonial period.12 In centring a discussion of wider maritime worlds and overseas 
connections on Burma and Rangoon, this analysis smooths out the ‘lumpiness’ in the 
attention and focus of wider oceanic historiographies as well as expands a wider literature 
connecting twentieth century Asia.13  
Though the creation and actions of the Bombay Improvement Trust (BIT), Bombay 
Development Directorate (BDD), Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT), Singapore Housing 
and Development Board (HDB) and Hong Kong Housing Authority (HKHA) have attracted 
varying degrees of scholarly inquiry over the past two decades, Rangoon’s urban 
development remains relatively unexamined.14 While the consequences of the RDT have 
been recently been considered in the context of the city’s racial tensions during the 1930s, the 
housing of the poor in Rangoon has otherwise been of little consequence to historians.15 This 
 
11 Tristan R. Grunow, 'Paving Power: Western Urban Planning and Imperial Space from the Streets of Meiji 
Tokyo to Colonial Seoul,' Journal of Urban History 42, 3 (2016); Carola Hein, 'Japanese Cities in Global 
Context,' Journal of Urban History 42, 3 (2016). 
12  Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
Renaud Egreteau, 'The Idealization of a Lost Paradise: Narratives of Nostalgia and Traumatic Return Migration 
among Indian Repatriates from Burma since the 1960s,' The Journal of Burma Studies 18, I (2014); Jonathan 
Saha, 'A Mockery of Justice? Colonial Law, the Everday State and Village Politics in the Burma Delta, C.1890-
1910,' Past and Present 217, 1 (2012); Law, Disorder and the Colonial State: Corruption in Burma C.1900 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); 'Madness and the Making of a Colonial Order in Burma,' 
Modern Asian Studies 47, 02 (2013); 'Is It India? Colonial Burma as a 'Problem' in South Asian History,' South 
Asian History and Culture 7, 1 (2016). 
13 Frederick Cooper, 'What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian's Perspective,' 
African Affairs 100, 399 (2001); Sunil S. Amrith and Tim Harper, 'Introduction,' in Sites of Asian Interaction: 
Ideas, Networks and Mobility, ed. Tim Harper and  Sunil Amrith (Delhi, India: Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
14 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in India, 
C.1850-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Prashant Kidambi, 'Housing the Poor in a 
Colonial City: The Bombay Improvement Trust, 1898-1918,' Studies in History 17, 1 (2001); The Making of an 
Indian Metropolis: Colonial Governance and Public Culture in Bombay, 1890-1920, p. 71-114; Nikhil Rao, 
House, but No Garden: Apartment Living in Bombay's Suburbs, 1898-1964 (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2013), p. 5-6; Vanessa Caru, Des Toits Sur La Grève (Paris: Arman Colin, 2013); Jiat-Hwee 
Chang, 'Tropicalizing’ Planning: Sanitation, Housing, and Technologies of Improvement in Colonial Singapore,' 
in Imperial Contagions: Medicine, Hygiene and Cultures of Planning in Asia, ed. Robert Peckham and David 
M. Pomfret (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013); Nancy  Kwak, 'Selling the City-State: Plannning 
and Housing in Singapore, 1945-1990,' in Another Global City: Historical Explorations into the Transnational 
Municipal Moment, 1850-2000, ed. Pierre-Yves Saunier and Shane Ewen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008); Nancy Kwak, A World of Homeowners: American Power and the Politics of Housing Aid (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015); Alan Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatters, Fires and Colonial Rule in 
Hong Kong, 1950-1963 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006). 
15 Noriyuki  Osada, 'Housing the Rangoon Poor: Indians, Burmese, and Town Planning in Colonial Burma,' 
in Sites of Modernity: Asian cities and their evolution though trade, colonialism and nationalism 
(Chulalongkorn University 2011). While housing the poor has been of little consequence to historians of 
Rangoon, a historian of urban China has argued for the importance of the urban poor in the tumultuous period of 
early twentieth century Chinese history. Given Rangoon’s complicated and complex history during this time, it 
seems important to focus not only on the well-connected elites and middle classes, but also the urban poor in 
order to gain a fuller understanding of Rangoon and Burma during this period. For more on urban poverty in 
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article, taking into consideration the contributions of scholars of urban development in 
Bombay, Hong Kong and Singapore, examines the actions and influences of the RDT as well 
as its successor, the National Housing and Town and Country Development Board, on 
poverty and housing in Rangoon.  
In addition to broadening an understanding of urban development and poverty in Rangoon, 
the chronological scale of this study points to the continuities of urban development before 
and after decolonization. It argues that although an imperial urbanism and a post-imperial 
urbanism in Rangoon were not continuous, they did share a contiguous relationship – that is 
to say that an imperial urbanism in Rangoon informed, but did not direct the development 
and application of a post-imperial urbanism in the city. In this way, this examination begins 
to challenge and extend the chronological horizon of existing scholarship on urbanism in 
Asia – a literature which often fails to bridge the span of the Second World War. 
In examining Rangoon’s efforts to clear slums and resettle squatters, this paper will be 
divided into four sections. The first section illustrates Bombay’s influence on framing debates 
about Rangoon’s urban environment from 1915 to 1941 and suggests that Bombay was a 
model for the development of an imperial urbanism across Asia littoral. The second section 
demonstrates the extent to which Rangoon’s municipal authorities adapted a Bombay model 
to the Burmese context before the Second World War as well as discusses the failings of 
mass housing for the poor in Rangoon. The third section considers the ways in which 
Rangoon looked east to Hong Kong and Singapore for examples of urban renewal during the 
post-war period and the final section argues that (re)construction projects in Rangoon after 
the Second World War until the military coup d’état in 1962 illustrated an emergence of a 
new post-imperial urbanism in Asia.  
 
Framing debates in Rangoon with a Bombay model 
 
This section argues that a Bombay model, centred on the BIT and the BDD, was the primary 
influence on urban development as it related to public housing and an urban environment of 
poverty in Rangoon before World War II. It begins by analysing debates in the 1910s about 
creating an improvement or development trust in Rangoon and goes on to demonstrate 
Bombay’s continuing influence on Rangoon’s discourses until the 1940s. In doing so, this 
analysis expands a fairly extensive historical literature on the BIT and BDD to consider these 
institutions’ wider role in promoting a model that was adapted in cities across South and 
Southeast Asia during the first half of the twentieth century. As the following sections of this 
article argue, it was this Bombay model that served as the foundation from which an imperial 
urbanism spread across cities in British Asia. 
Before diving into the details of the specific plans and schemes executed in Rangoon and 
Bombay, this section introduces the institutions of the BIT and BDD. Created in 1898 in 
response to an outbreak of the bubonic plague, the BIT’s board was made up of public 
officials and some of the city’s leading industrialists. Influenced by an analogous Glasgow 
Improvement Trust, the BIT was seen as a way to lessen the contentions of poverty and vast 
inequities in living conditions.16 While the BIT played an active role in developing and 
redeveloping Bombay’s poorest neighborhoods and suburban lands along the city’s edges in 
 
China see Janet Y. Chen, Guilty of Indigence: The Urban Poor in China, 1900-1953 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2012). 
16 For more about the connections between Glasgow and Bombay see Sandip Hazareesingh, 'Interconnected 
Synchronicities: The Production of Bombay and Glasgow as Modern Global Ports C.1850–1880,' Journal of 
Global History 4, 1 (2009). For more about the aims and implications of the BIT, see Kidambi, The Making of 
an Indian Metropolis, op. cit., p. 70. For more on the BDD see Caru, op. cit.. 
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the first two decades of the twentieth century, the improvement trust became increasingly 
focused on its larger set of improvement schemes – which involved the development of 
suburban neighborhoods like Sion, Dadar and Matunga – rather than on building chawls, or 
tenement houses, for the poor and working classes.17 Though the BIT had constructed 8,861 
one-room flats in permanent chawls and an additional 4,575 rooms in semi-permanent chawls 
by 1922, the housing situation in the city, particularly for the city’s poorest residents, still 
frustrated municipal authorities.18 
This growing frustration of municipal and provincial officials, along with resistance to the 
redevelopment projects of the BIT, led to the creation of the Bombay Development 
Department in 1919. 19  An arm of Bombay’s provincial government, the BDD was an 
executive authority which did not seek the kind of consensus or input from Bombay’s public 
in the way the BIT had sought.20 The BDD took on the BIT’s responsibility of building 
chawls for Bombay’s poor and working classes, constructing flats in Worli, De Lisle Road, 
Naigum and Sewri.21 While the BDD was in the process of building or had built 16,800 flats 
by 1924, it had already scaled back plans of building 50,000 new tenement flats because of a 
lack of demand for the units.22 Plagued by poor construction quality and a severe lack of 
demand for the one-room tenement flats it was constructing, the BDD faced financial 
problems and was dissolved into the Bombay Municipal Corporation 1930.23 
Bombay’s experiences creating an improvement trust to clear slums, resettle squatters and 
reclaim land can be seen as influencing the debate over taking similar measures in Rangoon 
from the outset. A 1917 report on town planning in Rangoon that ultimately justified creating 
the RDT noted that ‘as long ago as 1899, the Government of India suggested a separate trust 
to perform the work of Land Reclamation in Rangoon’.24 While the Government of Burma 
made inquiries into Bombay’s reclamation projects and a land reclamation fund began 
operating in the 1910s, it did not have the kind of financial mechanisms of an improvement 
trust in place to keep it monetarily afloat. 25  Aside from its financial failings, the land 
reclamation fund carried out some schemes that would have fallen under the responsibilities 
of an improvement trust had it existed in Rangoon at the time. A report of a 1917 suburban 
development committee pointed out ‘that improvement of slum areas upon the Government 
 
17 Rao, op. cit., p. 24-8. 
18  Estimates for the number of chawls come from Maharashtra State Archives, Public Works Department, 
Development Department (Henceforth, MSA, PWD, DD), 1922, 12 II, p. 27, ‘Questions asked in the Legislative 
Council Bombay Sir Chimanlal H. Setalved answering question no. 5 by S. K. Bole, M.L.C. at the ensuing 
meeting of the Legislative Council’, 22 July 1922. 
19 MSA, GD, 1918-1919, 1919, 379, p. S-M 9-14, ‘Housing Problem - How it is being tackled by in England 
by JP Orr’. 
20 MSA, PWD, DD, 1921, 225, Sr. 42, H. V. Braham, ‘Establishment of a Directorate of Development to be 
against as at on a department of Government and an executive authority to undertake development work in 
Bombay City and the Areas immediately adjoining it’, 18 November 1920. 
21 MSA, PWD, DD, 1926, 26, Industrial Housing in Bombay, p. 21, ‘Report on the working of the 
Development Directorate for the year ending 31 March 1926’. 
22 MSA, PWD, DD, 1924, 26/II, p. 53-61 ‘Report on the working of the Development Directorate for the year 
ending 31 March 1924’. 
23 MSA, PWD, DD, 1930, 53/36, p. 10, ‘Report of Mr. T Harvey on Development Department Chawls, 
Report of the Special Advisory Committee on the Industrial Housing Scheme, 25 March 1927’; MSA, PWD, 
DD, 1930, 153, p. 174-6, ‘Abolition of that Development Department and Distribution of the work of the DD’, 
5 December 1929. 
24 BL, IOR, V/27/780/12, 1917, p. 78, ‘Report of the Departmental Committee on Town Planning, Burma, 
Rangoon’. 
25 MSA, GD, 1910, 50, 460, p. M-S 21, ‘Information required by the Government of Burma concerning the 
conduct of Improvement projects in Bombay City’, 4 June 1910; BL, IOR, V/26/780/12, 1917, p. 12-3, ‘Report 
of the Suburban Development Committee, Rangoon’. 
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estate will no doubt be an early duty of the Reclamation Fund when its finances revive’.26 
Though a trust did not materialize until 1920 in Rangoon, Bombay’s experiments clearly 
played a role in influencing debates in cities around Asia littoral. In addition to setting the 
stage for the land reclamation projects and the creation of new trusts, the BIT also served as a 
model which municipal authorities from other cities, like Rangoon, could study. Gavin Scott, 
the then President of Rangoon’s Municipal Committee, specifically visited Bombay and 
enquired into the city’s municipal system and ‘studied the working of the Bombay 
Improvement Trust’.27 For those authorities working to set up the RDT, Bombay’s example 
clearly influenced the ways in which urban redevelopment could be conceived in Rangoon. 
Beyond sparking and shaping the creation of the RDT, Bombay and the BIT and BDD 
continued to influence discourses on slums, squatters and urban development projects in 
Rangoon into the 1920s and 1930s. An informal manifestation of this influence is seen in the 
language used by municipal administrators in Rangoon in describing housing in the city. On 
multiple occasions from 1910-1941, administrators, politicians and residents submitting 
depositions for committee reports and refer to the need for chawls.28 Borrowed from Marathi, 
a language spoken in a region of Western India roughly corresponding to what is known 
today as Maharashtra, a chawl roughly describes a tenement block of housing. As the word is 
derived from Marathi and Bombay was and is the premier urban centre for Marathi speakers, 
it is clear that it arose in the context of describing and building urban housing in specifically 
Bombay. Beyond the etymology of chawl, both contemporary and modern usage of the word 
refer specifically to the context of Bombay – that is to say that it is not used in other Indian 
cities like Calcutta or Delhi or in the contexts of Hong Kong or Singapore. Using the 
terminology chawl then denotes a certain awareness of and connection with Bombay’s urban 
environment. While other cities, particularly Calcutta, provided slightly differing models of 
creating public housing and developing an urban environment of poverty, the use of chawl 
suggests Bombay’s pervasive and primary influence in Rangoon. 
While a shared lexicon suggests a powerful connection, Bombay’s policies themselves 
ultimately illustrated solutions to municipal policy makers in Rangoon. A report in the 1920s 
demonstrates Bombay’s primacy within discourses on urban development in Rangoon. In the 
1926 public health committee report evaluation of ‘proposed remedies & workman’s chawls’, 
the BDD’s mass construction of workmen’s housing in the 1920s is raised and deemed too 
elaborate for Rangoon. 29  In the notes of dissent, a member of the Rangoon Legislative 
Council, Narayana Rao, commented, ‘we have waited long, and we now expect the 
Development Trust to undertake such schemes [similar to Bombay’s chawl developments] 
because no one has come forward to do them’. In pushing the Development Trust to build 
mass housing for workers, Rao suggests applying Bombay’s contemporary policies to 
Rangoon. Arguing that ‘the improvement and expansion of the City of Rangoon, for which 
the Development Trust was created, could not be attained without providing cheap sanitary 
dwellings to the poor and working classes,’ he took the position that the role of development 
should be an expansive one as it was in Bombay under the BIT and even more so, the BDD.30 
 
26 BL, IOR, V/26/780/12, 1917, p. 12-3, ‘Report of the Suburban Development Committee, Rangoon’. 
27 British Library, Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections, London, United Kingdom (Henceforth BL, APAC), 
P/V 1176, 1941, p. 9-10, ‘Report of the Rangoon Development Trust Enquiry Committee, 1941’; BL, IOR, 
V/27/780/12, 1917, p. 77, ‘Report of the Departmental Committee on Town Planning, Burma’. 
28 For some examples of the use of chawl see National Archives of Myanmar, Yangon, Myanmar (Henceforth 
NAM), 4756, 4/6(21), 1927, p. 33-4, 36, ‘Report on the Public Health of Rangoon Vol. I’ and NAM, 11865, 
4/19(22), 1960, p. 13, 75, ‘Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the effects of the removal of rent 
control in Rangoon’. 
29 NAM, 4756, 4/6(21), 1927, p. 33-4, Report on the Public Health of Rangoon Vol. I’. 
30 Ibid., p. 61. 
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That is to say, Rao saw direct poverty intervention as key to development rather than general 
municipal improvement as a tide that necessarily lifts all boats. 
This section has argued that a Bombay model, constructed upon the actions of the BIT and 
BDD, was a source of ideas, policies and projects that ultimately framed urban policy and 
informed policy makers in Rangoon during the early twentieth century. While the next 
section will explain in more depth the ways in which a Bombay model was adapted to 
Rangoon’s urban environment before the Second World War, this section has demonstrated 
the extent to which Bombay’s experiences shaped debates over how best to improve and 
construct an urban environment of poverty in Rangoon. Arguing that the spread of a Bombay 
model constitutes the application of an imperial urbanism upon Rangoon’s urban 
environment, these debates over an urban environment of poverty in Rangoon suggest that 
Bombay became a centre for urban development during the first half of the twentieth century 
in a similar way that India as a whole was a centre for Britain’s Indian Ocean empire in terms 
of inspiring architecture, encouraging migrations as well as supplying police forces and 
soldiers.31  
  
Adapting a Bombay model to a Burmese context 
 
At the same time developments in Bombay were influencing debates about the built 
environment of urban poverty in Rangoon, an imperial urbanism was being constructed 
around poverty in the city. Though Rangoon’s development projects and improvement 
schemes were not built to the same scale as they were in Bombay before the Second World 
War, these projects and schemes represent both an adaptation of a Bombay model that was 
also exported to other cities like Calcutta and Singapore as well an application of practices 
and techniques that constituted an imperial urbanism in Rangoon and beyond. This section 
examines the works of the RDT during the early twentieth century and discusses the ways in 
which these schemes represent a remodelling of projects contemporaneously conceived and 
constructed in Bombay. 
To begin to understand the ways in which Rangoon’s planning authorities adapted a 
Bombay model, this section briefly describes the city as well the demography of urban 
poverty in Rangoon during the late colonial period. Though J. S. Furnivall, an Indian Civil 
Service officer and sociologist who founded the Burma Research Society, coined the term 
‘plural society’ to describe Rangoon’s diverse but segmented communities, Rangoon was 
often described as an ‘Indian city’.32 Characterized as more racially diverse than other port 
cities in the British Raj like Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, Rangoon’s residents were 
counted as roughly half immigrants from British India’s other provinces in a 1931 census.33 
In testimony for a 1927 report on public health, Gavin Scott, the Municipal Commissioner 
Rangoon, estimated there were 250,000 ‘coolies’ in the city most of the year making up 
‘more than half the population.’34 Though some of these informal and unskilled workers had 
ancestral tires to Burma, census figures suggest that Indian immigrants constituted more than 
 
31  Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007); An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain's Raj (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1989). 
32  J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparitive Study of Burma and Netherlands India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948); Christopher Bayly, "Occasional Paper No. 3, Rangoon 
(Yangon) 1939-49: The Death of a Colonial Metropolis," (Cambridge: Centre for South Asian Studies, 
University of Cambridge, 2003), p. 1; Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's 
Asian Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p. 373-4.  
33 BL, APAC, W 2058/26 (1933), p. 65-6, ‘Census of India 1931: Volume XI, Part II – Tables’. 
34 NAM, 4758, 4/1(21), 1927, p. 9, ‘Report on the Public Health of Rangoon Vol. II’. 
  8 
85 per cent of Rangoon’s ‘unskilled and semi-skilled’ labour market. 35  In terms of 
understanding then the demography of urban poverty in Rangoon, Indians born outside of 
Burma constituted the largest share of the city’s poor. 
Comprising the most populous segment of the urban poor in Rangoon before the Second 
World War, Indian immigrants attracted much attention from planning authorities looking to 
improve their living conditions. A map of Rangoon in 1915 illustrates this focus on a 
specifically Indian poor from the outset of urban improvement in Rangoon [INSERT 
FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE. LEGEND: Figure 1. A 1915 map of Rangoon indicating the socio-
economic divisions in the city. Source: © The British Library Board, IOR/V/26/780/12, Map 
2]. As part of the report that called for the creation of the RDT to clear ‘slums’ around the 
city, this map identified in solid orange ‘the poorer classes, largely Indian, in large or small 
tenements and huts & houses without compounds.’ 36 Conflating Indians with Rangoon’s 
poor, the map confirms that the areas scheduled first to be cleared by the RDT are those 
inhabited by Indians in the east of the city, towards Pazundaung Creek. 15 years later, after a 
decade of similar RDT schemes, a statement of objects and reasons for a Rangoon Labour 
Housing Bill argued that ‘a large number of Indian workpeople would be thrown on the 
streets’ unless ‘the strict enforcement of the Municipal bye-laws governing lodging 
houses…were coupled with the provision of additional accommodation’.37 Along with the 
statement of objects and reasons, the Commissioner of the Irrawaddy Division further 
illustrates this conflation, having written about the Rangoon Labour Housing Bill that ‘in the 
first place the origin of this problem of deficiency housing in Rangoon is ex hypothesi an 
Indian cooly problem’. Continuing that ‘without them [the Indian coolies] the problem would 
be nothing like so serious, and would probably not require the intervention of the Provincial 
Government at all’, the Commissioner further demonstrated the emphasis authorities placed 
on improving Rangoon’s urban environment of poverty vis-à-vis improving the conditions 
facing Indian immigrants working as temporary and unskilled labourers.38 
While unskilled and semi-skilled labourers born in India attracted attention from 
government and local planning officials, the duration and nature of these immigrants’ stay in 
Rangoon posed a challenge to the city’s planning authorities. Improvement schemes 
completed by the BIT and BDD in Bombay were designed largely with workers from the 
city’s mill industry in mind.39 Though this kind of millwork would still have been classified 
as unskilled or semi-skilled labour in Bombay, the demography of poverty in Bombay then 
varied from Rangoon’s urban poor. Rangoon’s unskilled and semi-skilled Indian immigrants, 
overwhelmingly men, often came alone to the city and to Burma on short-term labour 
contracts.40 In contrast, Bombay’s urban poor tended to migrate back and forth from the 
 
35 BL, APAC, W 2058/26 (1933), p. 301, ‘Census of India 1931: Volume XI, Part II – Tables’. 
36 The report defined slums in ‘the accurate sense of an area overcrowded with irregularly disposed buildings 
and not laid out in streets’. BL, IOR, 1917, V/27/780/12, p. 93, ‘Report of the Departmental Committee on 
Town Planning, Burma’. 
37 NAM, 16665, 1/15e, 1931, J.A. Maung Gyi ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’, p. 6, ‘The Rangoon 
Labour Housing Bill’, 19 August 1931. 
38 NAM, 16665, 1/15e, 1931, Lieut-Col. E. Butterfield to the Sec. to the Gov’t of Burma, p. 18, 21, ‘The 
Rangoon Labour Housing Bill’. 
39 For example, a marked drop in occupied rooms in a BDD properties at Sewri, Naigaum, DeLisle Road and 
Worli was noted as coinciding with a ‘mill-strike’. See MSA, PWD, DD, 1926, 26, p. 44-8, ‘Report on the 
working of the Development Directorate for the year ending 31 March 1926’. See also the attribution of a mill 
strike in driving a spike in renters in arrears in MSA, PWD DD, 1924, 3A, p. 116, ‘Bombay and Suburban Area. 
Circulars, Agenda minutes, etc., in connection with the meetings of the Advisory Committee.’ 
40 An annual report on the working of Indian factories (India here including Burma) describes labour as 
temporary, ‘since the labour in Burma is almost entirely imported and does not look on this country as its 
permanent home’, see NAM, 152, 2/1, 1897-1940, ‘Annual Report on the working of the Indian Factories Act, 
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countryside.41 While many migrants did not bring their families to Bombay, some retained 
more conventional family structures, a point often discussed amongst housing and planning 
officials concerned about families overcrowding single room chawls.42 The demography of 
Rangoon’s poverty then necessitated adapting a Bombay model for a more transitory and less 
conventionally structured population. 
The adaptations of this model in Rangoon can be seen in efforts to focus on regulating 
‘lodging houses’ meant for more temporary and transitory labour as well as enforcing 
mandatory requirements guaranteeing each person floor space in shared accommodation for 
the poor.43 A report by members of the Rangoon Social Service League submitted as part of 
the 1927 public health report highlighted the problems of lodging houses, noting that on 
Godwin street ‘the sleepers swarmed out from the rooms like bees from a hive’. 
Documenting cases of overcrowding, the report also stated that there were, ‘for example, 25 
where 11 were supposed to be; 31 where 11 were supposed to be, etc.’.44 It also describes the 
ventilation in these houses as ‘non-existent’ and continues on that the ‘general filth is 
indescribable’.45 Apart from the report by the Social Service League, the main body of the 
public health report concluded, ‘the exhalations from overcrowded, sweating humanity lying 
actually on top of one another, and breathing the same foul atmosphere over and over again, 
must be sufficient to turn the strongest stomach’.46  While this emphasis on the housing 
conditions for more mobile labourers itself suggests an adaption of the Bombay model, the 
report’s conclusions represent another adaptation to Rangoon’s environment, namely that 
constructing housing was largely left to private means while Trust monies were instead spent 
on developing communications (i.e. roads and thoroughfares) and preparing house sites.47  
The fact that this report was completed seven years after the foundation of the RDT and 
continues to describe these problems of housing the city’s poor in ways reminiscent of the 
period before the work of the RDT is perhaps the strongest evidence of an adaptation of a 
pre-war Bombay model. Though a minority of the public health report’s authors, represented 
by Narayana Rao, argued that ‘providing cheap sanitary dwellings to the poor and working 
 
1911, in Burma for the year 1922’, p. 2, ‘Reports on the working of The India Factory Act, 1897-1940. Reports 
on the working of Municipalities 1876-77 to 1881-1882 (to the end of Rangoon Municipality)’. A 1927 report 
on rent control describes labourers in Rangoon and Burma, ‘this class of people stay in Rangoon for a short time 
en route to districts and those returning from districts remain here for a short time on their way to India so that 
Rangoon is more or less a clearing house for the whole of Burma’. For more see NAM, 11865, 4/19(22), 1960, 
p. 84-5, ‘Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the effects of the removal of rent control in 
Rangoon’; Census data points to the gender imbalance of Indian communities in Burma, see BL, APAC, W 
2058/26 (1933), p. 6-7, ‘Census of India 1931: Volume XI, Part II – Tables’. 
41 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India: Business Strategies and the 
Working Classes in Bombay, 1900-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 124-67. 
42 Ibid., p. 159-65; Professor HS Jevons of the University of Allahabad wrote, ‘the mere discomfort of family 
life in a single room abolished every ideal of right living’, in a piece critical of the BDD’s development projects. 
Sir Lawless Hepper, the director of the BDD, acknowledged the problem in his response, ‘As regards the single 
roomed tenements in Bombay I am afraid we can’t avoid them, much as I dislike the idea’. For more about this 
correspondence and criticisms of the BDD see MSA, PWD, DD, 1921, 702, p. 17-29, 32-3, ‘Certain suggestions 
made by Professor HS Jevons of the University of Allahabad in connection with the Development of Bombay 
and Suburban Area’. 
43 A 1927 Public Health Report on Rangoon defines lodging houses as ‘one room in a row of similar rooms 
often no more than 12 ½ feet wide and, allowing for the space at the back of the lot for kitchen and latrine, 
probably 30 or 40 feet deep’, see NAM, 4756, 4/6(21), 1927, p. 30, ‘Report on the Public Health of Rangoon 
Vol. I’. 
44 One inspection found ‘over 50 coolies’ where ‘the number allowed by regulation was 9’, see Ibid.,  p. 32. 
45 Ibid., p. 86. 
46 Ibid., p. 32. 
47 Ibid., p. 37-8. 
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classes’ was an integral part of ‘the improvement and expansion of the City of Rangoon’ with 
which the RDT was charged, the majority agreed that ‘there never was any intention that the 
Trust should provide buildings’. 48  Arguing that preparing house sites and constructing 
communications constituted a means through which Rangoon was improved and expanded, 
the majority position largely informed the policy decisions of those on the RDT and in 
Rangoon’s municipal government. Though Rao articulated that ‘no one has come forward up 
to now to undertake the construction of dwellings for labour’, his points ultimately did not 
push the RDT to take up its own housing schemes.49 
Even in this less direct method of tackling the problem of housing, the RDT faced calls to 
be more determinate. The Rangoon Social Services League, which strongly argued, along 
with Rao, that the RDT should take a more active role in constructing housing noted that 
even on an estate where the RDT had constructed roads and prepared housing sites, ‘there 
remain many old houses whose construction is very faulty, the general sanitation for which 
can be described as hopeless’. Suggesting that ‘something more comprehensive is needed 
which will have to include something like small model dwelling houses’, the League 
advocated for a stronger role for the RDT in intervening in the living conditions of 
Rangoon’s poor. 50  Rao and the Social Services League were not the only residents of 
Rangoon noting that the RDT did not live up to its potential. In a letter translated from 
Burmese as evidence submitted as part of the public health report, Maung Ba Kyaing, a 
landowner in Rangoon, expressed that ‘the poor classes are not benefitted by the work of the 
Rangoon Development Trust’.51 
This divide that had developed in the 1920s over the work of the RDT continued to be a 
point of debate into the 1930s. A report on the effects of removing rent control measures in 
Rangoon, the controls themselves modelled off of measures adopted in Bombay, highlighted 
again the views of a minority advocating for the construction of chawls for the poor in the 
city.52 While the main text of the report noted that by December 1929 a local government 
committee ‘is in favour of the erection of chawls and recognizes that they could only be built 
and rented at a financial loss’, it went on to say that that the committee writing the report ‘is 
unable to favour this suggestion which amounts to subsidizing, at the expense of the general 
tax-payer of the municipality, certain classes of buildings’.53 Though this argument represents 
an evolution of the position against adopting a Bombay model of construction housing for the 
poor, it ultimately precluded the large-scale construction of chawls in Rangoon before the 
Second World War. 
Despite the report on rent in Rangoon effectively blocking the RDT from adopting more 
aggressive anti-poverty measures, evidence submitted by residents of Rangoon as part of 
testimony for the report demonstrates a public displeasure with a lack of improvement in the 
city’s housing stock, particularly for the poor. Mr. S. N. Thakker, a resident at 93/151-155 
Fraser Street gave testimony to the committee about his eviction from his unit and argued that 
‘of all the hardships a poor man has to experience in Rangoon, the cruelty of the landlords is 
the worst’. Explaining the process of his eviction, Mr. Thakker, who had lived at the Fraser 
Street address for almost 15 years, noted that he was asked to leave ‘because he had made a 
 
48 Ibid., p. 61 , 37. 
49 Ibid., p. 61. 
50 Ibid., p. 85. 
51 Ibid., p. 99. 
52 NAM, 11865, 4/19(22), 1960, p. 3-4, ‘Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the effects of the 
removal of rent control in Rangoon’. 
53 Ibid., p. 14. 
  11 
complaint’ about the ‘considerable repairs’ that the house needed.54 Dr. P. A. Nair, a resident 
at 207-209 Lewis Street, described ‘many cases where more than one family is sharing the 
same flat’ and that there was ‘more overcrowding since the removal of rent control’.55 Maung 
Kywin Gyan, a resident of the Tatmye Quarter in Pazundaung, testified that tenants paid 
double in his quarter for the only available leases, ‘squatter leases’. He described that the 
‘sanitation is bad’ and the ‘water supply inadequate’ in his neighbourhood and continued that 
there was a lack of electric lighting and ‘very defective’ drainage.56  
Mr. S. A. A. Pillay, a pleader in Rangoon, offered testimony on the systemic rent increases 
that hit the city’s tenants, documenting cases in the city’s iconic Sofaer’s building where rent 
increased 40 per cent.57  Mr. C. K. Tambe, another lawyer in Rangoon, charged that the RDT 
increased ground rents in East Rangoon ‘by as much as 300 per cent to 400 per cent’ and 
argued that increases in rent had caused overcrowding and ultimately a spike in cases of 
tuberculosis.58 Mr. Tambe was not the only one linking disease and death to overcrowding, 
Mr. C. Thoy, the Secretary of Rangoon’s Tenants Association outlined a similar argument in 
his deposition to the committee.59 For those living in Rangoon’s poorer neighbourhoods or 
for those representing them, the removal of rent control measures demonstrated the lack of 
improvement and lack of commitment to improve housing stock for the poor living in the 
city.  
Their testimony stood in stark contrast to those like the Municipal Assessor, Mr. C. B. 
Rennick, who testified that limiting the number of people staying in lodging houses by 
putting ‘coolies in sanitary buildings’ would call into question if ‘economic’ or profitable 
‘rent will ever be obtained from them’.60 Even the dissenters who generally advocated for a 
more expansive role of government in developing housing for Rangoon’s poor noted that, 
‘we do not see how it is possible in the near future to contemplate the erection of chawls’ 
because of problems supplying enough water.61 In this way then, the report on rent controls in 
Rangoon illustrates the obstacles facing the city in adapting a Bombay model of urban 
development around poverty to a Burmese context. 
While chawls were ultimately never constructed in Rangoon before the Second World War, 
the RDT’s works laying out roads and developing lands along the edges of the city 
constituted both the adaptation of a Bombay model of urban development built around 
poverty as well as the construction of an imperial urbanism in Rangoon. Despite the hurdles 
facing the development of tenement housing for working class Rangoon, the RDT did engage 
in a number of more successful endeavours before the Second World War. Two pictures 
taken from the 1926-27 annual report of the RDT are a testament to the kind of work carried 
out by the RDT [INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE. LEGEND: Figure 2. Pictures from 
before and after the completion of works around the Sangyaung settlement, Rangoon, carried 
out by the RDT from 1926-1927. Source: © The British Library Board, IOR/V/24/2963].62 
The left image shows the Sangyaung settlement during ‘road works’ while the right picture 
shows the same settlement after the completion of the RDT’s works. Though the captions 
 
54 Ibid., p. 67. 
55 Ibid., p. 68. 
56 Ibid., p. 70. 
57 Mr. Pillay also noted cases where landlords ‘have taken more than 100 per cent, 150 per cent and 200 per 
cent increases’, see Ibid., p. 69. 
58 Ibid., p. 71. 
59 Ibid., p. 78. 
60 Ibid., p. 84. 
61 Ibid., p. 29. 
62 BL, IOR, V/24/2963, 1926-1927 ‘Seventh Annual Report of the Trustees: For the Development of the City 
of Rangoon on the working of the Rangoon Development Trust, for the year 1926-27’. 
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mentioned only ‘road works’, it is clear the images are meant to convey more a sense of 
general improvement. The left image depicts thatched roof houses and a curved street 
winding down the middle of the image in contrast to the rightmost image. Capturing the tiled 
roof buildings, straight streets with signage, drainage channels and manicured vegetation 
pushed to the edges of the road, the rightmost image exemplifies the RDT’s reclamation 
works around the city and illustrates visions of a reclaimed Rangoon. 
The structure of Rangoon’s labour market meant lodging houses for single, male, Indian 
labourers attracted the most attention from municipal and government authorities. As Osada 
has pointed out, this emphasis on a specifically Indian poverty in Rangoon inflamed racial 
tensions in the city at a time when Burma and Rangoon were experiencing some of the most 
violent protests in the late colonial period.63 Though a Bombay model of urban development 
loomed large in the minds of officials in Rangoon before the Second World War, the onset of 
the Japanese invasion shifted the attention of the city eastwards. As the events of the war 
forever changed Rangoon, a new post-imperial urbanism continued to be informed by the 
Bombay model and imperial urbanism that had dominated both the minds and the landscape 
of the city’s urban environment during the early twentieth century. 
 
Pivoting east to Hong Kong and Singapore for a new urban model of development after 
the Second World War 
 
The Japanese Christmas Day bombings in 1941 and the Allied bombings to recapture Burma 
in 1944 left Rangoon in shambles. 64  The city’s slow recovery was compounded by an 
unstable political situation – in the span of eleven years Burma was separated from India, 
captured by the Japanese and made into an independent client state, recaptured by the Allies 
and ruled by a military administration, briefly reintegrated into a British imperial framework 
and then granted independence. 65  To complicate things further, Burma’s independence 
sparked a series of armed conflicts that have continued to the present day.66 
The destruction and political instability in Burma largely mirrored the destruction and 
political instability more widely in what was Japanese-occupied Asia. From wars for 
independence in Indonesia and Vietnam to a civil war in China, the post-war situation drew 
the newly independent Burmese authority’s attention eastwards. While cities in India, like 
Bombay, had historically been points of comparison for administrators in Rangoon, cities like 
Hong Kong and Singapore – which faced their own post-war problems – quickly became 
points of comparison and reference for a reeling and reconstructing Rangoon.67 
 
63 Osada, op. cit.. 
64 A report on the problem of housing in Rangoon describes the importance of ‘removing the huts from the 
dilapidated bombed out building[s]’. This goes to illustrate the kinds of conditions facing Rangoon residents in 
the late 1940s. For more see NAM, 22, 11/8(5), 1950-51, p. 5, ‘The Housing Problem in Rangoon 
(Memorandum by Dr HMJ Hart, Statistical Advisor to the Government of the Union of Burma, in collaboration 
with U Kyaw Sein, Acting Chairman, Rangoon Development Trust)’. 
65 Burma, which had previously been a province of British India, was separated as its own crown colony in 
1937. The Japanese captured Rangoon and most of Burma’s territory from 1942-43. The Allies recaptured 
Burma and ruled via a military administration from 1945-46. A reinstated colonial government ruled Burma 
from 1946 until the country became independent on 4 January 1948. 
66 For a discussion of the armed conflicts, particularly as they relate to Burma’s Karen community, see 
Mikael Gravers, 'Disorder as Order: The Ethno-Nationalist Struggle of the Karen in Burma/Myanmar—a 
Discussion of the Dynamics of an Ethicized Civil War and Its Historical Roots,' The Journal of Burma Studies 
19, I (2015). 
67 India has been called a ‘centre of empire’ in Metcalf, Imperial Connections, op. cit., p. 1. For more about 
the post-war problems in Hong Kong and Singapore as they relate to housing see Hong Kong Public Records 
Office, Hong Kong, China (Henceforth HKPRO), HKRS156-1-579, 1944-1961, ‘Housing - Miscellaneous 
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This section argues that Rangoon’s officials looked eastward, particularly to Hong Kong 
and Singapore, in devising strategies for both rebuilding the city and dealing with the 
renewed problems of slums and squatters as a result of on-going conflicts in Burma. Given 
that both Singapore and Hong Kong had also looked to Bombay as a model for urban 
development before the war, this section suggests the emergence of a post-imperial urbanism 
that reflected changing politics in Asia and across the globe, but also demonstrated influences 
of the pre-war imperial urbanism that had previously dominated Rangoon. 
Though before the war Rangoon most clearly looked to Bombay for sanitation strategies 
and policies to tackle urban slums and squatter resettlement, municipal authorities did 
sometimes compare Rangoon to other cities in what is now thought of as Southeast Asia. A 
section of a 1926 public health report compared the number of malarial deaths in Singapore 
to those in Rangoon. Noting that the size of the population of Singapore was ‘almost exactly 
the same as Rangoon’, the report suggests an attempt by municipal authorities to draw points 
of comparison between the two cities.68 Noting that while ‘it would appear that malaria is not 
sufficiently bad to justify…anti-malarial works’ in Rangoon, ‘a great deal of money has been 
spent in Singapore and a great improvement effected’.69 While Rangoon ultimately did not 
embark on extensive anti-malarial public works, the report illustrates how examples of other 
Asian cities were used to influence contemporary debate over the future of the city. Though 
Singapore-style works were not adopted at the time, they were clearly suggested as an 
effective strategy for bringing down new malaria infections in the future. 
The use Singapore as a relevant point of comparison for authorities in Rangoon became 
more pronounced in the post-independence period.  As Burmese authorities looked for ways 
to rebuild Rangoon, they struggled with an influx of refugees from across Burma fleeing the 
armed conflicts. Owning only what they could carry while fleeing the violence, these 
refugees often became squatters on the sides of Rangoon’s roads, building small bamboo huts 
for temporary shelter. This problem of squatting along the side of the road and on other 
dangerous sites around the city attracted the attention of municipal authorities in the early 
1950s. They commissioned a joint report between the Government of the Union of Burma 
and the Rangoon Development Trust on the housing problem in Rangoon.70 
The report laid out the extent of the housing problem. It estimated there were around 
25,000 huts on open spaces, municipal lands and private property around Rangoon. 
Compounding the problem were reports of overcrowding in these huts as well as in the pucca 
area – the brick and mortar downtown area – of the old city. To combat these problems, the 
report outlined the need for a survey of quotidian conditions in Rangoon as well as an 
extensive town plan that could begin to accommodate the city’s burgeoning size. Including as 
an annex a 1920s report on the housing problem in Singapore, the Rangoon report 
demonstrates that Burmese officials were looking specifically to Singapore as model for post-
war Rangoon.71  
In the main text of the report, officials clearly drew conclusions from the Singaporean case, 
noting the costs per head of constructing tenements in Singaporean dollars and then 
converting them to figures denominated in 1950s Burmese currency. Going on to argue that 
 
documents received from the S of S on’ and NAS, HDB 1057, SIT 240/39, ‘Reports on the Constitution 
activities of the Singapore Improvement Trust, 1939-1956’. 
68 NAM, 4756, 4/6(21), 1927, p. 45, ‘Report on the Public Health of Rangoon Vol. I’. 
69 Ibid, p. 44-5. 
70 NAM, 22, 11/8(5), 1950-51, p. 3-5, ‘The Housing Problem in Rangoon (Memorandum by Dr HMJ Hart, 
Statistical Advisor to the Government of the Union of Burma, in collaboration with U Kyaw Sein, Acting 
Chairman, Rangoon Development Trust)’. 
71 Ibid., p. 2-5. 
  14 
‘good housing is, however, a good investment, even though it may not give “economic 
returns”’, the report cited that house rent in Singapore, regardless of wealth, did not usually 
exceed 15-20 per cent of income. In raising the issue of affordability and ‘“uneconomic 
rents’”, the Rangoon report reflected a consideration of Singapore’s house building efforts 
and an analysis of their success. 72  
In addition to analysing the recent history of housing in Singapore, the conclusion of the 
report on the housing problem in Rangoon called for a ‘small technical committee’ to visit 
Singapore and Jakarta to ‘see and have explained the work done there’. Specifically, the 
report called for ‘house and tenement building in Singapore’ to be studied.73 The 1951-52 
report on the housing problem in Rangoon therefore illustrates a shift eastward in comparing 
and coping with Rangoon’s problems.  
Beyond studying Singapore, this eastward shift can also be substantiated by documents in 
the Hong Kong Public Records Office detailing a visit by the Mayor of Rangoon to Hong 
Kong in 1952.74 Taking place contemporaneously to the investigation into conditions and 
solutions in Singapore, the Mayor of Rangoon and a few Burmese government officials over 
four days viewed about a dozen sites relating to Hong Kong’s public infrastructure. 75 
Expressing to K. M. A. Barnett, the Chairman of Hong Kong’s Urban Council, that his chief 
interest lay ‘in the problem of water supply, refuse removal and resettlement of squatters’, the 
Mayor pointed out that these interests were ‘problems of pressing importance of his own 
Municipality’. 76  Drawing a link between Hong Kong and Rangoon’s challenges, the 
delegation toured public water works and hospitals, saw squatter settlements at Blue Pool and 
resettlement areas at Ching Man as well as visited the Hong Kong Housing Society at Sheung 
Li Uk and land reclamation works in Happy Valley along Stubbs Road.77 Apart from viewing 
these sites, closing remarks made by Barnett reiterated the common purpose of the 
delegation’s visit: 
 
It has been evident during our conversations that despite many external differences, Hong Kong 
and Rangoon do share a number of problems in common. Both suffered extensive damage during 
the war and experienced a long occupation by hostile forces; both have difficulty in supplying 
sufficient potable water to a dense urban population; both have difficulty in the disposal of urban 
refuse and both are attempting to solve it by reclamation schemes. Both suffer from a shortage of 
housing and it gave me a glow of fellow feeling to hear Your Worship describe the problem 
presented in Rangoon by squatters and the policy of resettlement outside the town which your 
administration is pursuing.78 
 
Barnett’s closing remarks point to the extent to which Burmese and Hong Kong officials 
thought that solutions to Rangoon’s problems lay in looking at Asian cities farther east than 
more traditionally looking west to India and Europe. They capture a growing sense of 
commonality that arose as a result of being captured and occupied by Japanese forces during 
the war as well as from facing the refugee crises resulting from violent conflicts in Burma 
and mainland China. 
Seen in conjunction with Rangoon official’s desire to study the case of Singapore, the 
Burmese delegation to Hong Kong can be seen as a sort of eastward pivot in how municipal 
 
72 Ibid., p. 13-4. 
73 Ibid., p. 17. 
74 HKPRO, HKRS41-1-7185, 1952-1956, ‘Mayor of Rangoon and Party - Visit of’. 
75 A calendar of the Mayor of Rangoon’s visit can be found in Ibid., #3(2). 
76 Ibid., #3. 
77 Ibid., #3(2). 
78 Ibid., #3(3). 
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authorities in Rangoon imagined the future development of their city. Though Bombay’s 
chawls had previously been a lens through which the housing problem was conceptualized in 
Rangoon, the focus on Hong Kong and Singapore demonstrate an eastward-leaning 
reconceptualization of urbanism in Burmese context. It also points to the emergence of a 
post-imperial urbanism that emerged in Hong Kong, Rangoon and Singapore after the war. 
While not directly influenced by the British metropole, post-independence policies in 
Rangoon meant to tackle slums and resettle squatters were still largely framed in the context 
of the imperial urbanism of the preceding decades. 79  In this way, a new post-imperial 
urbanism developing in East and Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s was contiguous with 
and built upon an India-centred imperial urbanism developed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
 
Applying a post-imperial urbanism to post-war Rangoon until 1962 
 
While the previous section of this article argued that the municipal and planning authorities 
in post-war Rangoon firmly placed themselves within the milieu of an emerging post-
imperial urbanism in Asia, this section will demonstrate how these officials applied this post-
imperial urbanism to planning and constructing settlements around the city. It will begin with 
a brief discussion of the transition from and imperial to a post-imperial urbanism during the 
transition from the British Military Administration (BMA) to an independent Burma from 
1944-1948. The section will then focus on post-independence source material, previously 
unavailable to historians and made accessible by the National Archives of Myanmar in July 
2014, which points to the development of satellite towns around the edges of Rangoon as the 
most prominent manifestation of an Asian post-imperial urbanism.80 In constructing satellite 
settlements on the edges of the city from the end of the war until the military coup d’état in 
1962, municipal officials not only reflected on, but also cemented the physical and spatial 
legacies of a post-imperial urbanism on Rangoon’s urban environment. 
The transition from an imperial to a post-imperial urbanism in Rangoon coincided with a 
period of political transition in Burma. Though the BMA in Burma was interested in 
rebuilding the city’s infrastructure and stabilizing living conditions for those flocking back to 
Rangoon, it lacked the resources to make a significant impact on improving the war torn city. 
Despite the efforts of BMA Welfare Department in Burma, a shared name with the Army’s 
Welfare Services which focused on the ‘provision of such luxuries and amenities as could be 
permitted in active service conditions’, misconceptions ‘regarding the scope and functions of 
the new department’ persisted and ‘there was in consequence a tendency to attach unduly low 
priority to its needs’.81 In contrast to the Malayan Planning Unit, which operated in London 
for years before the reoccupation of Malaya, Burma’s Welfare Department, which was in 
time renamed the Relief and Labour Department, worked only intermittently during the war 
to plan Burma’s reoccupation.82 Still, the BMA in Burma did attempt to provide shelter 
through an Accommodation Committee set up in Rangoon as well as appoint C. B. Rennick, 
the former Municipal Assessor, to manage Civil Affairs in Rangoon as a precursor to 
 
79  For debates about reestablishing the Rangoon Development Trust – the institution through which an 
imperial urbanism shaped Rangoon – after World War II, see NAM, 33E, 12/1, 1946, ‘12th meeting - Wed. 23 
June 1946. To consider a memorandum by the Social Services Department on the expansion of the Board of 
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reestablishing the Rangoon Corporation. 83  Through a series of ‘dispersal centres’ and 
‘permanent camps’, the BMA also attempted to provide shelter for displaced persons and 
refugees in Rangoon and across Burma.84 
When the RDT was reconstituted along with a civilian government in 1946 following two 
years of military administration in Burma, its Chairman, U Chit Maung, argued that ‘the 
clock has been set back by many years’ and ‘if therefore, under normal conditions there was 
justification for the continued existence of the Trust for the completion of various schemes, 
the case for its continuance under the present abnormal conditions is much stronger than 
anytime in the past’.85 The reconstitution of the RDT in 1946 coincided with a renewed 
interest Rangoon’s built environment, particularly as it related to living conditions for the 
city’s poorest residents.  
As had been the case before the war, Burma’s post-war administrators continued to view 
Indian immigration as linked with poverty in Rangoon. Arguing that Indian immigration 
would make ‘the accommodation position even more difficult’ in the city, one of the 
government’s secretaries ‘enquired if Government proposed to control the numbers [of Indian 
immigrants] by fixing quotas or otherwise’.86 While viewing Indian immigration as at the 
heart of an accommodation shortage in the Rangoon represents continuity from the pre-war 
situation, the enquiry into the possibility of adopting measures restricting Indian immigration 
to Burma represents a shift. These meeting notes point to a new attitude amongst 
administrators that migration around the Bay of Bengal was not anymore a given and that 
flows and influxes of immigrants could potentially be controlled.87 
In addition to addressing concerns about Indian immigrants returning to Rangoon, the 
reconstituted RDT began in 1947 to focus on housing for populations displaced by the 
Second World War and ongoing conflict in Burma. While the Trust did not often construct 
structures for these displaced populations, it did at least attempt to create habitable conditions 
in Rangoon by clearing roads and providing drainage.88 Though the post-war RDT did not 
succeed at ameliorating Rangoon’s harsh living conditions in the short term, it did begin to 
develop plans for the coming decade. In line with an emphasis on social welfare in Singapore 
and Malaya in the aftermath of the Second World War, the actions of the RDT echoed larger 
concerns among post-war British officials concerned with the spread of communism in what 
was Japanese occupied Asia.89 While the RDT was replaced by a National Housing and 
Town and Country Development Board in 1951, the emphasis on social welfare continued.90 
With the immediate aftermath of the war behind them and more resources at their disposal, 
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newly independent Burmese officials at the National Housing and Town and Country 
Development Board pursued this social welfare agenda by framing issues of housing and 
accommodation in a new way – through the development of satellite towns.   
Satellite towns emerged as a key tool in Asian cities, like Hong Kong, for accommodating 
a burgeoning urban population. Concerned by high population density figures relative to 
European and North American cities, post-war urban planners looked to developing along the 
edges of urban centres to spread out urban populations. Given the connections made before 
the war between urban congestion and epidemic disease, reducing urban density was seen as 
essential in developing sanitary cities.91 Reports from Hong Kong in the 1950s on how to 
best develop low-cost housing exemplify these concerns over density. A report of the Reform 
Club of Hong Kong concluded that ‘on density figures alone, slum clearance is of vital and 
immediate importance.’ In building the case for this conclusion, the report calls estimates of 
12.8 square feet of living space per person in the Western District of Hong Kong 
‘horrifying’.92 In addition to reducing urban density, satellite towns also provided a cost 
efficient way to spread out urban populations. Given that land prices, as a result of 
speculation, had impeded improvement trust efforts in Bombay leading up to the First World 
War, buying unused land on the urban fringe represented the surest way to control overall 
development costs.93 Satellite towns in the Asian context then developed in the post-war 
period out of a need to house the influx of urban residents both inexpensively and in a way 
which reduced urban density. 
Though this emphasis on reducing urban congestion in cities like Hong Kong was justified 
through population figures, satellite towns emerged in post-war Rangoon in spite of a survey 
concluding that the congestion ‘cannot be considered serious.’94  The construction of satellite 
towns in Rangoon is then less rooted in discussions of conditions in the city as much as to 
discussions of other Asian urbanisms and regional strategies to tackle squatter settlements 
and slum redevelopment.95 The 1954 survey of social conditions in Rangoon asserted that 
‘the development of large fringe areas may not be as essential in the improvement of living 
conditions in Rangoon as it would be in the more congested areas of other Asiatic cities’ and 
yet municipal authorities continued to favour satellite towns as a means of redevelopment 
into the 1960s.96 This dominance of satellite towns and decentralization in Rangoon’s urban 
planning began under Burma’s democratic government and continued through to military rule 
from 1958-1959 and then again after 1962. 
This emphasis on congestion, decentralization and satellite towns is demonstrated in 
Burma’s period of democratic governance by plans for the construction of the Ba U township 
to be located across the river from downtown Rangoon at Dalla.97 While Dalla had been 
considered a site for redevelopment as far back as the 1920s, U Nu’s government 
commissioned American consultant John G. Claybourn in the 1950s to draw up plans that 
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provided ‘modern housing accommodation together with religious and civic center areas.’98 
Claybourn’s plans, which included workmen’s quarters for 2,560 government labour 
employees, substantiated concerns of ‘unsightly, insanitary and unhealthy development’ in 
Dalla.99 Reflecting perhaps his experiences working in Latin America, Claybourn suggested a 
‘Panama Canal design’ for housing in Dalla, a design that was both ‘adaptable’ and 
‘comfortable’.100 Claybourn’s plans for Dalla highlight the contiguous relationship between 
an imperial urbanism and Rangoon’s post-war built environment. Based largely off the 
practices of an imperial urbanism, post-imperial urbanism in Rangoon often borrowed and 
adapted plans from other imperial and transnational contexts. 
Dalla’s development as a satellite town of Rangoon in the early 1950s is not the only 
manifestation of post-imperial urbanism on the city. Under the direction of General Ne Win, 
who was handed control over Burma’s central government from 1958-1959, satellite town 
construction was drastically expanded, at least as told by the regime’s propaganda publication 
Is Trust Vidicated?. On the sites of three satellite towns – North Okkalapa, South Okkalapa 
and Thaketa – the military regime claimed to have laid out over 32,000 house plots 
accommodating an estimated 141,000 people. 101  Documenting access to health clinics, 
medical services, roads, drains and water – though not electricity or sewerage – these satellite 
towns were represented as an improvement for many of Rangoon’s refugee residents. While 
the buildings themselves were constructed out of bamboo and other timber supplied by the 
Army and didn’t fare well in the monsoon and cyclone seasons – 168 houses were noted as 
destroyed in the course of one year in South Okkalapa alone – they were still touted as an 
alternative to the ‘dwellers of the hutments which has mushroomed all over the City during 
the years after the War’.102 Though this piece of propaganda likely oversold the military 
government’s successes, the framing of these projects – as satellite towns complete with 
many modern amenities not unlike those in Hong Kong or Singapore – expresses the 
influence that a nascent post-imperial urbanism had on urban development projects in 
Rangoon. 
Beyond the spectacle of constructing the satellite towns at Okkalapa and Thaketa, their 
target populations – mostly families fleeing the upheaval of Burma’s on going conflicts – 
reflect the changing priorities of post-independence realities. While RDT officials had 
enquired into the possibility of ending Indian migrations to Burma, the democratic and 
military governments had made these enquiries a reality.103 These development projects then 
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were built with another population in mind – namely families fleeing the ethnic violence of 
post-war Burma. If the aim of these satellite towns – to house specifically refugee families – 
does not itself illustrate a shift in policies geared toward accommodating Rangoon’s poorest 
residents, the names of the satellite towns North and South Okkalappa called back to well-
known Barmar lore. 104  This change in the objectives of housing – primarily in the 
imagination of those deciding what kind of person would be housed – illustrates in part a 
difference between the influences of a post-imperial urbanism as compared to an imperial 
urbanism. While an imperial urbanism had been designed to mitigate the problems of 
migratory populations, a post-imperial urbanism instead focused on managing the challenges 
associated with an influx of refuges families – a challenged shared by cities like Hong Kong 
and Singapore as well.105   
Both the debates around and the development of housing for the poor in Rangoon and 
Burma shifted markedly after the Second World War. While Rangoon’s municipal and 
planning officials read about, studied and visited Hong Kong and Singapore for inspiration 
on how to tackle Rangoon’s population of slum dwellers and squatters, they also physically 
constructed new settlements and satellite towns along the lines of those in Hong Kong and 
Singapore in the post-war period. Though Bombay’s model had proved influential in 
Rangoon and Singapore during the late colonial period, a new model developing in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, which both adapted and expanded upon Bombay’s model, came to 
frame debates around and the construction of a built environment of urban poverty in 
Rangoon. 
 
Rangoon and an Asian urbanism 
 
This article has illustrated the extent to which and the ways in which debates about housing 
the poor in Rangoon were influenced by an emerging Asian urbanism. Though this urbanism 
was initially associated with the imperial project in Asia and was transmitted through a model 
tackling poverty through urban development that emerged in and emanated from Bombay, a 
post-imperial urbanism began to take shape in Hong Kong, Rangoon and Singapore after the 
Second World War. Based around solutions to a shared set of problems associated with 
wartime destruction, refugee influxes and poverty, this post-imperial urbanism remained 
contiguous with and influenced by the Bombay model and pre-war urban development. After 
all, the Singapore Improvement Trust, which became a model institution for Rangoon and 
Hong Kong after the war, had itself been ‘set up along the lines of the Improvement Trusts in 
Bombay’.106 
In locating Rangoon’s history of urban development with respect to housing within the 
wider networks of trade, diaspora and politics that shaped the city in the early and mid-
twentieth century, this article has built upon the work of Sunil Amrith, Nile Green, Tim 
Harper and Su Lin Lewis.107 Beyond reconnecting the city to more accurately reflect its 
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history of integration with the Bay of Bengal and the wider Indian Ocean, this analysis has 
begun to address a historiographical ‘lumpiness of cross-border connections’ that has 
developed in the study of port cities and oceanic connections.108 While scholars have tended 
to focus on connections emanating from certain cities and territories, particularly those that 
are wealthier and better connected in the present, others cities and places, like Rangoon and 
Burma, have received relatively little academic attention. In a similar manner, this article has 
also spanned a gap in Indian Ocean studies that tends fracture along the division of the Bay of 
Bengal and the Arabian Sea. 
In understanding how an Asian (post-)imperial urbanism shaped and modeled an urban 
environment of poverty in Rangoon, this article has also demonstrated the ways in which a 
Burmese and a South Asian identity diverged over the twentieth century while the county and 
urbanites in Rangoon increasingly identified as Southeast Asian after the Second World 
War.109 Showing that the shifting demography of poverty in Rangoon corresponded with 
changing regional and national identities, this analysis has demonstrated a way in which 
urban poverty helped reshape and reform a Burmese identity. 
In addition to a reshaping and reforming of identities, this article has also examined ways 
in which Rangoon’s poor had a meaningful influence on the development of the city. While 
the city’s poor were viewed by planners, politicians and officials as critical to securing 
particular visions for the future, poor residents themselves also actively participated in the 
machinery of planning and policy to communicate their own experiences and positions. The 
archival material underpinning this article’s analysis, which includes testimony translated and 
experiences transcribed from illiterate sources into English in order to be relevant to 
government committees, demonstrates the determination with which poor people and 
advocates for the poor approached contesting policies aimed at lessening poverty and 
inequality in Rangoon. 
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